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This essay brings together central facts about global poverty, suggests modest obligations for citizens in the affluent nations in addressing the problem, and provides suggestions as to how we should conceive of our obligations and argue for them. Over the last three or four decades professional philosophers have paid increasing attention to global poverty, and it may well be wondered whether anything new or interesting is left to say. Rather than an exploration of the ethics of our relations to the world’s extreme poor, does not the interesting and important intellectual work in this area have to do with why the problem persists and how, concretely, it may be resolved? Indeed, I must admit that once I became aware of the world’s poverty situation, the questions of whether this really constitutes an intolerable injustice and whether something should be done about it were about as open for me as the question of whether slavery is permissible. The pressing problems really are why enough is not being done and how enough can be done. Of course, when enough is not being done, questions as to who is morally culpable for not doing enough, what, exactly, morality requires of us in these situations, whether we should assist from a duty to do good by others or from a duty not to harm them, etc., all provide grist for the philosopher’s mill. These are legitimate inquiries, but I shall not pursue them here, at least not in the expansive and abstract ways they are typically pursued, for two reasons. For one, others have done it and can do it better than I. For another, much of the so-called developed world has already issued declarations about the urgency of this problem, their responsibilities in addressing it, and made commitments which, if acted upon, would significantly curtail the poverty in our world. This essay takes as its starting point that the world’s rich nations have a moral duty to help alleviate extreme world poverty (some of the vagueness of this statement will be removed as the essay develops). But, given that this is the case and given that these countries have not done what they have promised to, what, if anything, should citizens of these countries do? This is the basic question I attempt to make clear and address here. The inquiry thus takes a relatively conservative approach to the problem of world poverty in that it does not scrutinize the basic commitments that world governments have made with respect to the situation, although I will have a few remarks about this. Rather, it assumes that these commitments are morally appropriate and asks what citizens of the rich world should do given this and given that their countries have failed in their own commitments. Now, any prescription of an ethically appropriate response by citizens of affluent nations should derive not only from moral standards, but should also be sensitive to social realities (including pre-existing political commitments and what is feasible) and the motivational structure of human psyches. In my opinion, too much of the philosophical reflection on this issue displays a lack of sensitivity to how individuals are motivated to take moral action. The result is often detrimental to the humanitarian aims behind those philosophers that write on the issue: they declare as immoral and evil many individuals who fail to do something for the extremely worse off. This poses the dangers of leaving some even less willing to act and others suspicious that there must be something fundamentally wrong with thinking that there is anything citizens of the affluent world should do for the extremely poor. Before advancing my response, we need a basic idea of the poverty situation and what the world has done about it. 1. The World’s Poverty Situation, What’s Been Promised, and What’s Been Done The most widely used standard of what constitutes “extreme poverty” is that utilized by the World Bank. According to this definition, a person is classified as living in extreme poverty if she has or lives in households that have incomes below $1 per person per day. This line is adjusted for purchasing power parity, which means that if you are below the poverty line, no matter where you live, your income level per day has less purchasing power than $1.08 had in the United States in 1993. Currently, in our world of 6.5 billion persons, 1.1 billion people live in extreme poverty. The World Bank also uses a $2 / day poverty line: 2.7 billion persons live below this. What does it mean to fall below such lines? Poverty lines are typically set so that those that fall below them are either deemed to have insufficient means to meet their basic needs such as food, clothing, and shelter (this is the $1 / day line) or deemed to be barely able to meet their basic needs but must forego other important things like primary education and health care (the $2 / day line). If we think of “basic needs” as including things like adequate health care and access to education, we can say, without exaggeration, that 42% of humanity is unable to meet its basic needs. Most of the world’s extreme poor live in East Asia, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. For these people, being unable to meet such needs translates into much suffering and early death: about one third of all human deaths per year—18 million persons—result from poverty-related causes. In particular, UNICEF estimates that 11 million of these deaths are children; that averages to about 30,000 children dieing each day from poverty-related causes. UNICEF, and many other agencies and individuals, also estimate that many of these deaths are from completely preventable or treatable illnesses like malaria, tuberculosis, diarrhea, chronic hunger, and respiratory infections. At no time on earth have there been more people in poverty than over the last century. The haunting juxtaposition is that at no time on earth has there been a greater gap between the poor and the rich (one can measure this in a number of ways; for example, one can compare per capita income among countries). The story of how the world got into this situation is a morally interesting one marked by, among other things, a combination of exploitative practices and the rise and uneven burgeoning of production power fueled by technological innovations. Suffice it to say that both the world’s current poverty situation and how the world got into it are morally disturbing in the extreme. It constitutes, among other things, a blatant denial of human rights to almost half of humanity: article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, in part, that Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services….It continues: Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.Given the world’s poverty situation, what has been done about it? This is a complicated question for we need to look at what has occurred both inside and outside of the countries in extreme poverty; we need to look at private actions as well as non-governmental and governmental actions. I focus here on the governments of the affluent world for two reasons. The first is that while individuals in the private sector and non-governmental organizations like OXFAM have for many years stalwartly and courageously labored on behalf of the world’s poor, often leading to dramatic, life-saving improvements, it is governments of the affluent world that stand to remedy the poverty situation the most. Second, it is appropriate to focus on the affluent nations’ governments and their actions in international contexts because the governments in extreme poverty cannot by themselves move out of their poverty; this is a well-documented aspect of the world’s poverty situation. Indeed, there is good evidence that much of the intelligent, heroic efforts of many poor nations to move out of poverty with minimal assistance from the international community have actually been prevented, sometimes unknowingly, by the rich nations from coming to fruition. For example, when the government of Malawi, a land-locked sub-Saharan African nation in which more than 25% of its population lives in extreme poverty, made well-thought out proposals to the international community to get affordable anti-AIDS drug treatment to a third of its population—about 300,000 people—the end result was enough funding to save only 25,000. Jeffrey Sachs called this “a death warrant from the international community for the people of this country.” (The End of Poverty p.10) So, what have the world’s governments done? In September 2000 at the United Nation’s Millennium Summit, 189 government leaders from the highest political levels of almost every country in the world agreed to eight Millennium Development Goals (MGDs) to be achieved by 2015. The first goal is a halving of the number of people living on less than $1/day (see http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals). I take this agreement to indicate recognition by these governments that they have a moral duty to help alleviate extreme poverty. Moreover, a fair understanding of what this duty implies for each country should be sensitive to, among other things, the ability of each country to take actions which would alleviate poverty while causing minimal burdens on its own peoples. This places special responsibility on the affluent nations. Now, I had said earlier that I would ask about what citizens of the affluent world should do relative to the standards and commitments that their own governments have committed to—the MGDs—and that I would not question the standards. Obviously, the standards are eminently questionable: it seems to condone the millions that will die (one conservative estimate is 135 million) from 2000 to 2015 as a result of poverty-related causes. It seems that way, but the question is complicated by what is a feasible goal by 2015. Obviously this is not the same as what governments say is feasible, but to assess this matter requires empirical work and the marshalling of some data. And this would take us beyond the scope of this paper. In any case, it is important to evaluate someone’s or some group’s conduct on standards to which they themselves have committed. In order to do this, we need to ask what this commitment to the first MGD requires of the affluent world, and how they have fared in meeting that requirement. In 2005, United Nations development experts published a report providing figures on the kinds and amount of investment required by the world to meet the MGDs. It was estimated that $135 to $195 billion dollars a year would be required, not only to half extreme poverty by 2015, but, if continued over the years, substantially eliminate it by 2025. This amount is less than 1% of the rich countries GNP each year: it is about .44% to .54%. (See The End of Poverty, especially chapter 15). What’s more is that the rich nations have committed themselves in writing to giving more than this amount! The United States, for example, was a signatory of Agenda 21, a document adopted in 1992 at the United Nations Rio Summit on Sustainable Development. In chapter 33.13 it states: Developed countries reaffirm their commitments to reach the accepted United Nations target of 0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA [overseas development assistance] and, to the extent that they have not yet achieved that target, agree to augument their aid programmes in order to reach that target as soon as possible and to ensure prompt and effective implementation of Agenda 21.This same commitment to 0.7 per cent was reaffirmed by the United States at the Monterrey Consensus in 2002 in which they adopted a document that stated: We urge developed countries that have not done so to make concrete efforts towards the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) as ODA to developing countries…These declarations are not new: a similar one was made in 1970. How have the rich countries fared on their commitments? Only five of the twenty-two rich donor countries met these targets; they include: Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. The United States gives only about 0.15 percent; this figure has been roughly the same over the decades. The upshot of all of this is that the rich nations have failed on their commitments to give amounts which are, on the one hand, eminently miniscule relative to their wealth and, on the other, estimated to greatly alleviate extreme poverty. What, then, is a citizen of one of these rich countries to do? 2. Taking Action in a Spirit of Oneness I think that some such principle is true: if one’s democratic government is engaging in an immoral action or seriously failing to behave in a rational and moral manner, then, if one is a secure and well-off citizen of such a government and one knows about such failings, then one ought to express disapproval or concern to one’s government about them. This is too conservative for some, but the strength of the principle is its weakness. Because it is relatively uncontroversial, many are bound to accept it, and, once they also accept that the rich nations’ approach to the poverty problem is unacceptable, they should also accept the conclusion that, as a citizen, they ought to do something. And if enough people become aware of the world’s poverty situation and express concern to their governments in a concerted fashion, much good may be done. There are various organizations that are devoted to such projects; for example: the ONE Campaign (http://www.one.org/); Bread for the World (http://www.bread.org/); and DATA (http://www.data.org/). One of the strengths of such organizations is their attempts to promote concerted action at crucial moments in political decision-making. Of course, calling one’s government to account is not the only way of addressing extreme poverty. One may also financially contribute to various organizations like OXFAM (http://www.oxfam.com/) and UNICEF (http://www.unicef.org/) that provide help were it is most needed. These are just a few available avenues for intelligent responses to the problem. Despite the existence of such organizations and the clear moral imperative to do something on the poverty question, little remains done. This has baffled some thinkers and led others close to making comparisons between citizens of the affluent world today and relatively well-to-do citizens of Nazi Germany who stood by idly while millions were massacred. Now, I think part of the explanation of why little action has been taken on the part of the public has to do with misinformation about the issue. But even when the information and clear moral imperative is presented to many, they still are little moved to act (those that have taught a philosophy course where students read Peter Singer’s article “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” can observe this). Why is that? Some of it has to do with what look to be pervasive features of human social behavior, especially the well-documented tendency of individuals to be less responsive to those in distress when others are also unresponsive. I want to close by suggesting two complementary, and perhaps deeper, reasons for inaction by those that know of the situation, reasons from which we can learn to fashion new and compelling philosophical arguments. The first is the somewhat implicit tendency to look upon the poor as mere recipients. This I take to be a form of objectification. If one asks why some of the affluent world should care about the extremely poor, one often gets two types of responses. The first is that we are in a position to do great good for them while loosing very little ourselves, and the second is that we, or our governments, are actually harming them and that this needs to be countered and stopped. Both of these responses are undoubtedly strong, and, in my opinion, correct. But both construe our obligations to the extreme poor as arising out of our ability to either benefit or harm them. This is undoubtedly an important and necessary perspective. But it does not reach deep enough. Even Thomas Pogge, an engaged philosopher who is somewhat sensitive to this issue, mostly argues for assistance to the poor in this vein. He writes, “we must stop thinking about world poverty in terms of helping the poor. The poor do need help, of course. But they need help only because of the terrible injustices they are being subjected to. We should not, then, think of our individual donations and of possible institutionalized poverty eradication initiatives… as helping the poor, but as protecting them from the effects of global rules whose injustice benefits us and is our responsibility.” (World Poverty and Human Rights, 23). I think much good would result if we advanced arguments that went beyond generating obligations out of our abilities to benefit or harm the poor, but rested on an affirmation of the value of the extreme poor to our collective human future. We must dare to advance and articulate realistic visions of the future of our world wherein the good of one is intimately tied to the good of all. This is old school. But can it be that part of the reason we and our governments do little is because we care little, and the reason we care little is because we see the lives of the poor as having little to do with our collective future on this planet? Metaphors that may suit this conception are humanity as one family or as vital parts of one human body. This is all fine and good it may be thought, but how do we get individuals to accept such a conception? My response is that much of the raw material for this kind of moral picture of the world is latent in the belief systems of many in the world today; it is latent in their religions. The writings of the world’s great religions repeatedly point to the spiritual equality, if not ascendancy, of the poor with others, and continually call upon us to uplift the downtrodden. Unfortunately, some thinkers stray from exploiting these conceptions and their concomitant exhortations. This is the second reason I propose for inaction on the part of many, even when they know of the facts: the reasons and emotions offered to them come from outside of their own deeply held commitments and motivations. If we take the time to understand the metaphysical and moral beliefs of many in the world today, we stand a better chance of motivating action. My suspicion is that philosophers stray from this approach because they begin by scrutinizing and rejecting the metaphysics (sometimes misrepresented) of many religions; this leads them to not bother with any morality that is based on such metaphysics. They believe that such a morality could in large measure be generated, and significantly improved upon, from secular foundations. This may or may not be true. But whether it is, is beside the point. In ethics, philosophical brilliance needs to be tempered with humility and a willingness to argue, appreciate, and see things from within perspectives with which you may fundamentally disagree. It was this virtue that allowed John Stuart Mill to proclaim in Utilitarianism that his secular ethics was an attempt to approach the ideal of the ethics of Jesus of Nazareth. Such a virtue may well assist us in our attempts to bring poverty to an end. Shahin Izadi is a philosophy graduate student at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. His interests include ethics, political philosophy, and philosophy of religion. |